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THE MIDDLE KINGDOM RETURNS TO THE SEA ,
WHILE AMERIC A TURNS ITS BACK
How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and
the Implications for the World
Christopher J. McMahon

The condition of the American Merchant Marine is such as to call for
immediate remedial action by the Congress. It is discreditable to us as a
Nation that our merchant marine should be utterly insignificant in comparison to that of other nations we overtop in other forms of business.
We should no longer submit to conditions under which only a trifling
portion of our great commerce is carried in our own ships. To remedy
this state of things would not merely serve to build up our shipping interests, but it would also result in benefit to all who are interested in the
permanent establishment of a wide market for American products, and
would provide an auxiliary force for the Navy.
PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, 1901

Command of the marine transportation system has long acted as the
stage on which great powers compete. . . . The infrastructure facilitating
the transport of maritime commerce—ocean-going vessels, deep-water
ports, high-speed railways, and fiber optic cables—descend from technologies Western powers once leveraged in the 19th and 20th centuries
to expand their access to foreign markets. Today, the MSR [China’s
Maritime Silk Road] mimics these strategies, for example, by building
railways in Africa or laying transoceanic data cables. In some locations,
new MSR projects are literally replacing colonial projects. The MSR is
a strategic economic policy, intended to promote the Chinese workforce,
build bilateral ties, foster dependence, and ensure near-exclusive access
to foreign ports for Chinese controlled or affiliated vessels. . . . Through
MSR projects, China can advance both economic and non-economic
objectives simultaneously.
REPRESENTATIVE SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (D-NY), CHAIR,
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND
MARINE TRANSPORTATION, 17 OCTOBER 2019
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S

ince the founding of the United States during the Revolutionary War, nearly
every president has recognized and called for congressional support of a strong
U.S. maritime industry.1 As the United States supposedly is a maritime nation
with a massive international trading economy, it seems obvious that control of,
or at least strong influence over, America’s seagoing supply chains is important.2
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Merchant Marine was
one of the largest and most efficient of its kind in the world—partly because of
public and political support.3 In those decades U.S.-flag clipper ships dominated
many trades, including—ironically—the China trade. But the second half of that
century saw the industry go into steep decline—in some measure because political support had evaporated. For economic and strategic reasons during the first
half of the twentieth century—specifically, immediately prior to World Wars I
and II—Congress intervened, taking critical steps to support the industry. But
today that past support of the industry has disappeared once again, and the U.S.
maritime industry engaged in international trade is in a perilous state of affairs.
This has occurred as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become, by far, the
leading commercial maritime power in the world.
The lack of a vibrant U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade places
the strategic and economic interests of the United States and its allies in grave
jeopardy. This is particularly so given that the PRC now dominates most sectors
of the world’s maritime industry, and consolidation in all sectors is occurring at a
rapid rate that benefits the PRC. The influence and the effectiveness of the PRC’s
political and governmental intervention and funding in all sectors of China’s
maritime industry are causing numerous other companies in the global industry
simply to cease operations or suffer absorption by Chinese companies. There is
a strong prospect that within little more than a decade, or even sooner, China
virtually will control the world’s seagoing supply chain. The consequences of this
happening for the United States and the world as a whole are staggering. As a nation dependent on maritime transportation for its economy and for the movement
of its military forces, the United States must take decisive and immediate steps to
promote the reestablishment of U.S.-flag shipping and further enable all sectors of
the U.S. maritime industry to compete in a significant way in the global industry.
ONCE UPON A TIME
It was the winter of 1979–80. A buzz was going around the offices of the New
Orleans–based Lykes Brothers Steamship Company (also known as Lykes Lines)
and through its fleet of forty-five vessels. Word had it that SS Letitia Lykes was
loading full and down on the West Coast of the United States with eighteen thousand tons of cargo bound for Shanghai, China. Letitia would be the first U.S.-flag
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ship to call on a mainland Chinese port since World War II. This event was the
result of the ongoing rapprochement between the PRC and the United States that
followed President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and followon efforts by Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. The opening of this
new market indeed was cause for celebration.4
At the time, Lykes was one of dozens of U.S.-flag ocean-shipping companies.
With its forty-five vessels, Lykes was one of the larger U.S. companies, but not the
largest; that honor fell to SeaLand Services Corporation, which in 1979 was by
far the largest container-shipping company in the world. But in 1980, even with
more than 860 merchant ships, the U.S.-flag industry operated only about 3.8
percent of the world’s merchant vessels, which then totaled about 22,872 ships.5
That percentage was down from a 1946 high, when the United States operated
some 70 percent of the world’s commercial shipping.6 By 1960, this number had
fallen to 16.9 percent of the world’s fleet. Even so, in 1980 U.S.-flag shipping still
was significant. Plus, the U.S. maritime industry had made massive technological
innovations that revolutionized the industry, such as the introduction of container shipping and lighter-aboard-ship (or LASH) vessels.
SS Letitia Lykes, like all Lykes ships, had been built in a U.S. shipyard, supported by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) through the Construction
Differential Subsidy (CDS) program. U.S.-flag shipping companies were owned
and operated by American citizens without any foreign corporate interests involved. Profits stayed in the United States. U.S. shipping companies, particularly
SeaLand Services, owned or leased and operated dozens of container terminals
in U.S. ports and in ports throughout the world. While the United States at the
time was in the process of implementing a treaty to turn over operation of the
Panama Canal to Panama, the United States still exercised significant influence
in the canal’s affairs.7
Although in these years the United States did not possess the largest merchant
marine in the world, the size and influence of its industry still were considerable
in global maritime affairs, and with its large navy the United States rightfully
could be called a maritime nation, according to the criteria of naval historian
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, as laid out in his influential book The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660‒1783. Mahan believed that history
demonstrated that a truly maritime nation required a sizable merchant marine
in addition to a powerful navy.8
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-FLAG
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
In the decades leading to World War I, American agricultural and industrial
exports increased dramatically and America became the leading economic
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superpower, even as the U.S. Merchant Marine continued to decline. Americans
and American-owned businesses were confident that inexpensive foreign-flag
shipping would remain bountiful and readily available as needed to provide the
seagoing logistics the nation required. This proved to be a false assumption. With
the outbreak of war in 1914, the American economy, dependent on international
trade, suffered from a lack of availability of commercial ships. The European nations that had provided the commercial sealift for the American economy withdrew their vessels for political reasons and for wartime purposes. This caused
widespread disruption in trade; manufactured products piled up on American
docks, in railcars, and in warehouses, and agricultural goods spoiled because
they could not be brought to overseas markets. The American economy suffered
greatly because of the lack of available commercial shipping.9
The extent of the damage to the American economy caused by the shortage of
U.S.-flag shipping in 1914 was so serious that Congress finally decided to act, but
this took time, and the insufficiency of commercial shipping continued to imperil the economy. Following numerous and lengthy hearings, Congress passed
the Shipping Act of 1916, which created the United States Shipping Board. The
board was designed specifically to promote and assist the U.S. Merchant Marine.
By the time the board was fully established, however, it was apparent the United
States would enter the war soon. This placed the board on a wartime footing. In
October 1917, the board requisitioned the entire U.S. Merchant Marine.10
In 1917, the Shipping Board initiated a huge shipbuilding program through
the creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Eventually, the board contracted for more than 1,700 merchant vessels. Despite this unprecedented effort,
only 107 ships were delivered before the armistice was signed in November
1918. However, the remaining vessels were completed by 1922, and it was hoped
that U.S.-flag companies would purchase them, and some did. Following World
War I, the United States ranked number one in the world, at least in numbers of
potentially available merchant ships. But the country never followed through on
this advantage.11 By the 1930s, the U.S. Merchant Marine again was in a perilous
condition owing to political neglect. And ominously, the challenges of World War
II were on the horizon.
Other legislation that attempted to support U.S.-flag shipping included the
so-called Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Pub. L. No. 66-261) was
sponsored by Senator Wesley L. Jones from Washington State. A major purpose
of the act was to support the rights of American seafarers by solidifying laws
passed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the
act gave seafarers the right to sue their employer for workplace (shipboard) injuries. A second provision of the act would establish procedures for transferring
the U.S. government‒owned merchant vessels built in response to World War I to
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private ownership. The lessons learned from World War I included recognition
that the U.S. Merchant Marine was critical to national security. The preamble to
the Jones Act included the following summary: “It is hereby declared the policy
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage
the maintenance of a merchant marine . . . sufficient to carry the greater portion
of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated by citizens of the United
States.”12
As one way to support and maintain the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Jones Act
also renewed cabotage legislation that Congress had established and maintained
during the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. The policy
required trade between U.S. ports to be restricted to U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, U.S.flag, and U.S.-crewed merchant ships. (The very first piece of legislation that
Congress passed under the Constitution, in April 1789, established a tariff on imported goods to protect U.S.-flag shipping. This was followed by the Navigation
Act of 1817, which expressly excluded foreign-flag vessels from trading between
U.S. ports.)13 Cabotage legislation, including the Jones Act, always has ensured
that there are U.S.-flag vessels to serve coastal, inland, and island trades, and it
has continued to provide jobs for mariners, who then have been available to serve
on strategic sealift vessels in times of national emergency. But this legislation was
suspended prior to World War I because of the lack of U.S.-flag ships.
The key legislation that clearly defined support for the U.S. Merchant Marine
in the twentieth century was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. From the time the
law was enacted through the next forty-five years, the U.S. Merchant Marine enjoyed generally strong support from Congress and presidential administrations.
The act established the U.S. Maritime Commission (later renamed the Maritime
Administration). It established the CDS program, which provided funds to support the construction of ships in U.S. shipyards. The act also established operating differential subsidies (ODSs), which provided funds to enable and encourage
shipping companies to operate their ships under the U.S. flag. Finally, the act established the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, an institution dedicated to educating and training merchant marine officers. It is not an exaggeration to state that
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 played a pivotal role in preparing the United
States for World War II and, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the quick construction of the largest and most capable merchant marine the world had ever
seen, despite huge losses of ships and mariners during the early years of the war.14
In an effort to support U.S.-flag shipping further, Congress passed two companion bills in 1954, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
(Pub. L. No. 83-480) and the Cargo Preference Act (Pub. L. No. 83-664), which required a percentage of government-impelled cargo, such as food aid, to be carried
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on U.S.-flag ships.15 These requirements, overseen by MARAD, have guaranteed
cargoes for U.S.-flag ships and provided financial support for the industry.
With the support of Republican president Nixon, a Democratic Congress
passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. This legislation increased the subsidies
provided by MARAD’s CDS program, which substantially increased the construction rate of new merchant ships in U.S. shipyards, yielding dozens of ships.
As a result, relatively large numbers of new and technically innovative ships
joined the U.S.-flag fleet in the 1970s, and the shipbuilding industry in these
years was particularly healthy, as was the U.S. maritime industry in general.16
Many of these same shipyards built warships for the Navy, and the large numbers
of both commercial and Navy contracts enabled economies of scale that allowed
shipyards to build vessels at lower per-ship costs.17
THE GLOBAL MARITIME WORLD CHANGES—THE U.S. MARITIME
INDUSTRY TODAY
When SS Letitia Lykes departed Shanghai on the transit back to the United States
from its historic voyage in the spring of 1980, its cargo holds were nearly empty.
In those years, the Chinese had little to sell to a U.S. market. With only twentysix PRC-flag vessels in international trade, the Chinese shipping industry was
equally insignificant.18 While Chinese shipyards built some small coastal trading
vessels and fishing boats, they produced no large vessels. There were few or no
Chinese companies operating in other countries, and certainly no Chinese companies operating ports and terminals outside China.
What a difference forty years makes! The U.S. maritime industry has retreated
on all fronts, whereas the Chinese industry has exploded in size to become, by
far, the largest in the world, in nearly every category. This has been the result of
public, corporate, and political apathy in the United States and quite the opposite
in China; in the latter, government and industry have partnered for decades to
implement strategic plans to grow all sectors of the industry. In the United States,
it also is the result of a public and political lack of understanding of the role the
maritime industry plays in the strategic and economic health of the nation. The
U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade had been in decline since
World War II; however, those American companies still operating ships in international trade into the 1980s entered a steep decline at that time, eventually going
bankrupt and ceasing operations.
When the Reagan administration came into office in 1981 it almost immediately eliminated the CDS shipbuilding program provided by the Merchant
Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970. Over the next several years, this action, in turn,
forced the closure of numerous commercial shipbuilding companies across
America. In 1975, U.S. shipyards produced seventy deep-sea commercial ships.19
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The Reagan administration’s abolition of the CDS program crippled the industry.
Today no subsidies are provided to build vessels in U.S. shipyards. As a result,
only a few shipyards remain in the United States that are capable of building
deep-sea commercial ships, and the future financial health of these remaining
yards is in question. The only commercial ships built after 1980 have been for
Jones Act trades, which require ships built in U.S. shipyards.
In 2016, the number of commercial ships constructed in U.S. yards averaged
only five vessels per year during the previous five years, in a context of a worldwide production average of 1,408 vessels per year.20 Ironically, whereas to some
the elimination of shipbuilding subsidies had the apparent effect of reducing
costs to the taxpayer, the actual impact may be the opposite. Navy vessels and
Jones Act vessels were and still are required to be built in U.S. shipyards, but
with fewer shipyards building fewer vessels, economies of scale could not be
realized, so the unit cost of each ship became far greater.21 Between 1987 and
1992, an average of fewer than two commercial seagoing vessels were built per
year; as noted, between 2010 and 2016, the average was five.22 Equally serious
has been the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure and shipbuilding jobs, with a
concurrent loss of shipbuilding skills and expertise. These are capabilities that
cannot be turned on with the flick of a switch.
Since 1980, the size of the U.S.-flag fleet in international trade likewise has
declined dramatically. In the early years of the Reagan administration, actions
were taken to eliminate the ODS that enabled many companies to conduct operations under the U.S. flag.23 These subsidies were provided by contract, so these
payments had to be phased out over time as contracts expired. As ODS contracts were not renewed, the majority of U.S.-flag companies ceased operations
or simply went bankrupt. This created a crisis for the military, which requires
a capable U.S. Merchant Marine to carry equipment and supplies in the event
of a national emergency. To remedy this situation, the Department of Defense
spent billions of dollars to purchase and convert dozens of older, foreign-owned,
-built, and -operated vessels, which were placed in a Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
maintained and operated by MARAD (since 1981 part of the U.S. Department
of Transportation).24 In addition—and with the urging of the Defense Department—Congress in 1996 established the Maritime Security Program (MSP),
which MARAD manages. MSP essentially provides a subsidy for sixty U.S.-flag
ships—notably similar to the original ODS program created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.25 Currently, the MSP program is funded at five million dollars
per ship, per year.26 Considering the high cost of establishing and maintaining
the RRF in combination with the MSP program, it is questionable whether the
taxpayers benefited at all from the elimination of the ODS program; the reverse
probably is true. In any case, the results have included the loss of nearly all U.S.
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shipping companies, a great reduction in the number of U.S.-flag vessels, and the
loss of thousands of skilled mariner jobs.
The MSP law requires that U.S.-flag vessels be owned and operated by a U.S.
company under the management of U.S. citizens, and the sixty MSP ships indeed
are “owned and operated” by U.S. companies registered in the United States.
However, nearly every one of these sixty ships is owned by a U.S. company that is
merely a subsidiary of a foreign company—and the parent companies and their
countries may have interests different from those of the United States. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
in 2018 there were 94,169 commercial deep-sea vessels in the world, of which
50,732 were merchant ships.27 Today, including the sixty MSP vessels, there are
only about eighty U.S.-flag vessels operating in international trade.28
As if political reversal of support for the U.S. Merchant Marine were not
enough to decimate the U.S.-flag industry, attacks on the cabotage provisions of
the Jones Act—periodically vigorous—have reached a new height in the last two
years. Spearheaded by the Cato Institute and other special-interest groups, efforts
have been made in the form of dozens of articles, conferences, and even recent
proposed legislation on Capitol Hill to overturn the law.29 While presenting no
substantive and verified cost data to show that the Jones Act causes significant
financial burdens to U.S. consumers in states, commonwealths, and territories
served by the act compared with using foreign-flag carriers, Jones Act detractors
fail to understand the law’s strategic importance. First, elimination of the Jones
Act poses the possibility of causing Jones Act companies to cease operating under
the U.S. flag, thus further reducing the number of available U.S. merchant ships.
(This would be particularly true if foreign-flag companies, subsidized by their
governments, were allowed to enter Jones Act—that is, domestic American—
trades.) Second, with the loss of the jobs that Jones Act companies now provide,
the pool of qualified U.S. merchant mariners virtually would disappear. This
would make it impossible to crew the ships of the RRF and other strategic sealift
vessels. This in turn would cripple military logistics, which is dependent on these
ships in a national emergency. From a security standpoint, overturning the Jones
Act has the potential to enable foreign companies (particularly those subsidized
by their governments) effectively to assume control of inland transportation
in the United States, with the result that thousands of foreign nationals would
be operating vessels inside the United States—a potential security nightmare.
Finally, under similar laws, U.S. airlines are afforded the same protections the
U.S. maritime industry enjoys under the Jones Act. Some airline industry professionals believe that if the Jones Act were repealed these airline protections might
be eliminated as well, possibly causing the demise of the U.S. domestic airline
industry, similarly to what happened to the maritime industry.30
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Regarding port ownership and operation, whereas U.S. companies such as
SeaLand Services once operated containership ports around the world, that
company, like many U.S.-flag shipping companies, ceased to operate when it was
purchased by a foreign-owned company. The ports and terminals once owned by
SeaLand now are owned or operated by foreign port operators. The only U.S. port
operator with terminal operations outside the United States is SSA Marine, which
operates slightly more than a dozen terminals in ports around the world, in addition to its North American terminals. However, nearly half the interests in SSA
are held by foreign nationals.31 In a reversal from the past, numerous foreign port
operators and interests have purchased or leased control of many ports and terminals in the United States, which has caused national-security concerns.32 The
United States no longer is involved in crucial maritime infrastructure in other
countries. For example, there is little or no U.S. involvement in the Panama Canal; a Chinese company operates ports and terminals on both ends of the canal.33
In short, if a maritime power is defined as a nation possessing a powerful
navy, a sizable merchant marine, and capable maritime industries such as shipbuilding—a definition propounded by Alfred Thayer Mahan—then the United
States clearly is no longer a maritime power. Instead, the United States probably
is described better as a maritime-dependent nation, and likely is defined even
better as a maritime nation that soon will be dependent on the Chinese maritime
industry.
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM—HISTORICALLY A MARITIME POWER?
Understandably, given its huge terrestrial presence in Eurasia, for much of its history China primarily has been viewed as a continental nation. However, China
also has had a strong maritime connection and has a rich maritime past. Geography encourages China to look toward the sea, particularly in the south, where
mountains block easy access to the interior and there are thousands of populated
islands off the coast. For centuries, southern seaboard provinces and islands have
had large populations, but a dearth of available land has made it difficult to support those populations locally, making the sea critical for transportation, trade,
fishing, and communication with other Chinese regions.34
Today, China’s land border is 13,743 miles long, and the country abuts fourteen other nations. Through its thousands of years of history, China has pursued
countless wars of both aggression and defense against its many neighbors. Most,
but by no means all, of these wars have been fought primarily with land forces.
But China also has more than nine thousand miles of saltwater coastline, thousands of offshore islands, and several major rivers that connect to the sea, and
the majority of the nation’s population always has resided in coastal regions.
Therefore China, to varying degrees, always has kept an eye on its maritime
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interests. Chinese naval warfare began as early as the tenth century BCE and was
common during the Warring States period (475‒221 BCE). One story holds that
in 471 BCE the great Chinese philosopher Confucius sought a leadership position
with the Kingdom of Yue but was turned down because he lacked knowledge of
naval operations.35
Throughout most of its very long history, China has been a major manufacturing power, oftentimes the world leader. For thousands of years countries across
the Eurasian landmass have sought Chinese goods. The long, overland passage
called the Silk Road emerged as the major east–west trading route in the fourth
century BCE.36 Over the centuries that followed, the Silk Road continued to be a
major trading route between China and the Middle East, and even to Europe;
Chinese goods found their way to the Roman Empire. Eventually, the Silk Road
expanded to include seagoing routes across the Indian Ocean to Middle Eastern and African ports. In his book China as a Sea Power 1127‒1368, author Lo
Jung-pang notes that “China tried to become a seapower (in centuries past); in
particular, during the Qin and Han dynasties and later during the Sui and Tang
dynasties.” He further notes that during the three centuries from the Southern
Song to the early Ming period (twelfth century CE to fourteenth century CE), the
maritime and overseas activities of the Chinese were so great that China was
more of a sea power than a land power. It was by using its naval and maritime
power, across many centuries, that China went abroad to trade, and even to colonize other Asian lands.37
Chinese maritime power in centuries past reached its height during the
first Ming period (1405‒33), and especially during the reign of the third Ming
emperor, Yongle (1402‒24). He dispatched the renowned military commander
Zheng He (1371‒1433), known as the “Ming admiral.” From 1405 to 1433, Zheng
completed seven extraordinary voyages, during which he sailed with as many as
250 ships and upward of thirty thousand men to destinations in southern Asia,
the Middle East, and East Africa.38
The main purposes of these military-oriented voyages were to expand Chinese
influence throughout the Indian Ocean area and the Middle East, seek tribute
for the Chinese court from local rulers, expand Chinese cultural influence, and
improve trade. According to Naval War College professor Andrew Wilson, a key
difference between European and Chinese efforts to seek trade during the early
European age of exploration is that the Ming voyages did not seek trade so much
as “the gravitational pull of the Chinese market (from these voyages) brought
trade to [China]”—a phenomenon seemingly similar to the dynamic favoring
China in the twenty-first century.39
During the Ming period, China’s navy and merchant marine clearly were the
largest and most powerful in the world, and their sphere of influence expanded
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wherever Zheng’s fleet landed. At the time, Chinese maritime technology far
surpassed that of the Europeans. For example, the Chinese invented the compass
and the rudder, which were huge innovations that enabled mariners to navigate
and control vessels better on long voyages. Zheng’s fleet included ships over four
hundred feet in length. (By comparison, Columbus’s Santa María was somewhere
between sixty-two and eighty-five feet in length.) It is reasonable to assume that,
had the Chinese wished to pursue ocean exploration and trade into the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean and to Europe and even the Americas in the decades after
Zheng’s voyages, they likely would have become the dominant maritime power
on earth, eclipsing European efforts.40
For a complicated set of reasons, however, the Chinese abandoned their efforts
to pursue great voyages beyond local Chinese waters after the death of Emperor
Yongle. Following Admiral Zheng’s seventh and final voyage, the new Ming emperor had the fleet destroyed, after which harsh punishments were decreed and
imposed on those who even attempted to trade beyond Chinese waters.41 One law
imposed the death penalty for building a ship with more than two masts, and a
later law did the same for a ship with more than one mast.42 In essence, except for
coastal trade and fishing, the Chinese, under the second Ming dynasty, largely
abandoned the ocean.
This happened at the time when European countries were on the cusp of the
age of exploration that was made possible by the development of new maritime
technologies—many of which were based on lessons learned from Chinese
nautical technological innovations such as the compass and the rudder. As the
Europeans came to dominate global trade in the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries, the Chinese would pay dearly for their lack of maritime power. Their
navy was largely ineffective and they no longer possessed a capable merchant
marine by which to trade with other nations. For centuries this enabled the Europeans increasingly to impose countless demands on the Chinese and control
Chinese seagoing trade, eventually resulting in “the century of shame” (extending
from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century).43 This fact has
not been lost on the leadership of the PRC in recent times, and it helps to explain
why the Chinese have taken such great steps to become not only a global maritime power but the dominant maritime power in the world today.
European control of China’s seagoing trade continued into the twentieth century, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s.44 The world
wars, Japanese occupation in the 1930s and ’40s, and the civil war between the
Nationalists and Communists decimated the Chinese economy. Following World
War II, virtually all Chinese seagoing trade, both foreign and domestic, was carried in foreign-owned and -flagged ships. In 1950, the PRC merchant marine
officially consisted of only seventy-seven ships, and the majority of these were
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either unseaworthy or lying at the bottom of rivers and ports. Through the 1950s,
China enjoyed a rather close relationship with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets
encouraged Polish ships to carry Chinese seagoing trade; in fact, for many years
the Polish merchant marine was China’s primary provider of ocean transportation. During these years, there actually were no Chinese-flag ships engaged in
international trade. As far as PRC ports and shipyards went, the picture was
equally dismal in the 1950s. There were no shipyards capable of building oceangoing ships, and ports were hugely inefficient and few in number.45 The Chinese
did not own, lease, or operate any port terminals outside the mainland.
Despite the poor condition of the Chinese maritime industry in the early years
of the PRC, the Communist Party’s leadership fully grasped the importance of
the industry and placed great emphasis on building a capable maritime industry
in all sectors: ships, ports, shipyards, and mariners. It was clear to Mao Zedong’s
government that China needed a domestic maritime industry, particularly in
coastal and river trades to compensate for the poor quality of roads and railroads.46 With Soviet maritime expertise and the use of Soviet-built equipment,
particularly engines, China began building domestic ships in the early 1960s. The
initial building rate reached ten ships a year in 1960, but this fell to two following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The shipbuilding picture remained
poor for many years because of the lack of Chinese technology and engineering
capability and the inability to develop and build critical elements such as ship
engines. In terms of ship ownership, in 1961 the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was formed under the Ministry of Communications.
COSCO owned and controlled vessels under both Chinese and foreign flags. (In
the 1960s the PRC began relying on foreign flags to operate many Chinese-owned
ships. At the time, this included use of the British and Somali flags.)47 The first
voyage of a PRC-flag ship outside Asian waters was by SS Heping, which carried
cargoes from China to the Republic of Guinea in West Africa in 1962. The Chinese merchant marine continued to grow through the 1960s, reaching more than
three hundred ships by the early 1970s. Shipbuilding during this period remained
a very limited industry, particularly since China did not have the expertise to
develop and build nautical equipment and engines.48
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the PRC continued to emphasize
the development of its maritime industries, including shipping, shipyards, and
ports. The number of PRC ships engaged in international trade doubled during
this period. More ships were added to the Chinese flag-of-convenience fleets,
particularly using the Somali and eventually the Panamanian flags. During these
years, PRC ships began “cross trading,” which involved carrying cargoes to and
from ports other than China, and charging freight revenues in U.S. dollars, making the practice a good source of hard currency. In 1978, the number of PRC ships
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in international trade surpassed that of the United States, and by 1982 China’s
merchant fleet ranked seventh in the world in size.49
Of particular note during these years was the development of China’s port and
shipbuilding industries. Major efforts were undertaken to modernize Chinese
shipyards, and with technical assistance from European, Japanese, and Singaporean shipbuilders the Chinese began building ships for domestic and export markets. Costs per ship were so low and demand was so high that Chinese yards had
to suspend order books until shipbuilding capacity could be increased. During
this period, ports also radically improved in capacity and capability. From 1959
to 1979, there was a 3,750 percent increase in cargo throughput in Chinese ports,
but dock capacity had increased by only 30 percent. Given this serious situation,
major efforts were undertaken to develop and build port infrastructure, including the introduction of container-handling equipment.50 Through the next three
decades, Chinese leaders continued to increase the capability and capacity of
their maritime industries dramatically, in ship ownership, shipbuilding, port development, and a multitude of related industries. Today, China’s maritime industry, in all sectors, is the largest in the world by far, and it still is growing rapidly.
THE CHINESE MARITIME INDUSTRY TODAY
The PRC government’s decades-long support of the Chinese maritime industry
has included substantial, even aggressive, financial subsidies, laws, and policies designed to enable all sectors of the industry to grow at phenomenal rates.
Currently, with more than 5,500 merchant ships engaged in international trade,
Chinese companies (including Hong Kong‒based companies) own more ships
than those of any other nation on earth.51 Chinese container-shipping companies
combined carry more containers than the world’s number one carrier, Maersk
Line. This represents nearly 20 percent of all the containers carried by the top
twenty carriers.52
Chinese companies own or operate more ports and terminals around the
world than those of any other country.53 These Chinese companies include
Hutchison Ports, COSCO Ports, China Merchants Ports, Shanghai International
Port Group, and Qingdao Port International.54 In fact, by 2015 “two-thirds of
the world’s top fifty container ports had some degree of Chinese investment
in them, if not majority ownership and control, and this number is growing.”
These ports handle 67 percent of the world’s shipping containers.55 Chinese port
companies in all ports around the world handle 39 percent of the total volume
of containers—nearly double the share of the next largest port operator, which
is headquartered in Singapore.56 Of the top twenty ports in the world by cargo
throughput (2016‒17), fourteen are located in China.57 Almost “under the radar,”
Chinese port companies acquired 49 percent ownership in France’s CMA CGM
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port operations, which has given Chinese companies operational control of
Houston’s Terminal Link port and South Florida Container Terminal in Miami.58
COSCO has long-term lease/operations stakes in the ports of Los Angeles and
Seattle as well.59
By 2017, China was the number one shipbuilder in the world, as measured by
the number of ships completed, new orders, and pending orders. Over 40 percent
of the world’s commercial ships now are built in China, and this percentage is
growing as shipyards in other countries no longer can compete and are shuttered.60 (Notably—and troubling from a USN perspective—during a mere eightyear period, from 2009 to 2017, the Chinese developed and built eighty-three
warships for the Chinese navy, which now is the second-largest navy in the world,
and within a few decades or less is expected to be the largest.)61 With 150 modern
cutters and hundreds of other vessels, the China Coast Guard is the largest such
service in the world.62 Numbered at more than two hundred thousand vessels,
China’s fishing fleet also is the largest in the world.63
One of the secrets of Chinese successes in the incredible growth of the nation’s
maritime sector is the Chinese emphasis on maritime education—in nautical science, marine engineering, and maritime business. More than 115,000 students
attend the several Chinese maritime universities and colleges.64 Finally, China is a
global leader in ship finance, providing funds for international shipping companies
seeking to buy, build, or lease ships, particularly those from Chinese shipyards. In
2008, no Chinese bank was listed in the top ten of the world’s shipbuilding-loan
institutions; a decade later, the top two banks were Chinese—both state-owned
institutions.65 By 2025, it is projected that Chinese banks will provide 50 percent
of all shipbuilding loans.66 This means that, although China may not own or
operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it will have influence, if
not control, over a majority of the world’s merchant fleet, because it will hold the
mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned by companies in other countries.
China has made no attempt to hide its aspirations to influence, if not dominate, the world’s maritime industry. In 2015, the Shanghai International Shipping
Institute, a state-owned research institute, released a report, “China Shipping
Development Outlook 2030.” The report offers several conclusions. First, “China
will remain the largest cargo trader in the world and will take a dominant role
in global container shipping.” Second, China will double its shipping engaged in
worldwide trade and control at least 15 percent of that trade. To do this, China
will become the number one shipowner in the world. (It already is.) Ship operators will evolve to become “global logistics providers” (much like other large
containership operators, such as Maersk). The report notes that privately owned
Chinese shipping companies will account for “over 70% of China owned ships.”
(However, this runs contrary to the current trend in China of state ownership,
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which does not allow private-sector companies into the industry.) The report
suggests that Chinese foreign-flag fleets will comprise upward of 90 percent of
Chinese-owned ships. With regard to ports, the report notes that “throughput at
Chinese ports will reach 505 million TEUs [twenty-foot-equivalent containers]
by 2030.” Without providing specific metrics, the report indicates that “Chinese
enterprises will build port networks around the globe, especially investing in
port networks in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
other developing countries with strategic cooperation with China.” Finally, the
report emphasizes China’s role as a global leader in ship financing and marine
insurance.67
HOW CHINA IS REALIZING ITS MARITIME AMBITIONS: CHINESE
MARITIME STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
China’s Qing dynasty ruled the country from 1636 to 1912, a period of gradual
but persistent incursion by Europeans, and eventually by the Japanese, into
Chinese trade and influence. The Opium Wars with the British in the midnineteenth century saw Chinese military forces destroyed by the British, who
then forced the Chinese to allow the British Empire to import opium into China
in exchange for Chinese goods. Thus began “the century of shame,” during which
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan essentially carved China up into
spheres of influence.68
Following the civil war in China that ended in 1949 with the defeat of Nationalist forces by Communist forces on the mainland and the establishment of the
PRC, China’s economy was in complete shambles. For the next several decades,
under the absolute rule of Chairman Mao, China essentially pursued a policy of
isolationism and self-reliance under which the Chinese people were expected to
produce agricultural and manufactured goods without the influence or assistance
of outside nations.69 Mao’s policies further destroyed the Chinese economy and
caused the death of untold millions of people by starvation.
Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power and relentlessly pursued a policy of opening up China to the rest of the world by boldly
seeking foreign investment and trade. Knowing that he could not abandon the
façade of communist/socialist ideology, but likely knowing the failures of pure
communism and socialism, Deng adhered to a strict policy of pursuing what he
called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”70 The Chinese Communist Party
continues to use the phrase today. It is purposefully imprecise, but in broad terms
it refers to an economy that the state essentially controls while allowing varying
degrees of private investment and ownership.
Under Mao’s leadership, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established in
all sectors of the economy. These SOEs essentially operate as companies owned
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by the state. SOEs, in China, typically are managed at a provincial or even municipal level. Others are managed at the central government level by the StateOwned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).71 The
problem—as is typical of many government organizations worldwide—is that
SOEs, lacking financial incentives, are inherently inefficient and often become
bloated with choking bureaucracies and unproductive workers.
Deng knew this, and therefore introduced market-based reforms, including
the potential for private investment and ownership. Notably, Deng focused on
commercial shipbuilding as a critical industry, and under his leadership in 1982
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) SOE was established. In 1999,
a second SOE was formed out of CSSC: the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). These two SOEs dominated shipbuilding in China.72 In 2019, they
were reunited into one larger SOE.73
Over the decades since Deng, the role of SOEs has continued, with them exercising control over certain sectors of the Chinese economy but with private investment in SOEs being introduced to varying degrees and with varying success.
(Of Chinese SOEs, 66 percent are listed on the Chinese stock exchange.) Today,
privately owned companies actually employ more workers than SOEs, and these
privately owned companies account for the majority of China’s gross domestic
product (GDP).74 However, in certain sectors SOEs maintain absolute control.
One such sector is the maritime industry, which China views as a strategic industry vital to the interests of the nation.75 Despite statements in 2015 from Jin
Jiachen, a director at the Shanghai International Shipping Institute, that Chinese
ocean-shipping companies would privatize to a large degree, there is little evidence this has happened or will do so.76 Furthermore, under Chinese president
Xi Jinping there is new emphasis on and support of SOEs and less interest in
privatizing many industries, including Chinese maritime industries.77
COSCO is an SOE. The company operates a fleet of well over fifteen hundred
vessels calling on over a thousand ports worldwide. The COSCO fleet includes
most types of merchant ships, such as tankers, bulk ships, roll-on/roll-off (RO/
RO) vessels, and containerships. In 2015, COSCO merged with the SOE China
Shipping Group, retaining the name of China COSCO Shipping Corporation.78
COSCO expanded further in 2017 with the government-funded $6.7 billion
acquisition of Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), a public company
formerly based in Hong Kong. COSCO now is the third-largest containership
operator in the world.79 Even before its acquisition of OOCL in 2017, COSCO for
a time had taken the lead as the number one container-shipping company in the
world. With its acquisition of OOCL and its continued aggressive expansion policies, it is quite possible that COSCO will take the number one spot in container
shipping permanently.80
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For years, the global trend in the container-shipping business has been increasing consolidation, leaving fewer and fewer container-shipping companies.
China has taken full advantage of this trend, using the power of COSCO. A
United Nations think tank associated with UNCTAD contends that there are now
too few container-shipping companies left to ensure adequate competition.81 By
mid-2018, the top ten container-shipping companies carried 75 percent of the
world’s shipping containers, with COSCO as the number three carrier, carrying
over 12 percent of the world’s containers. The UNCTAD report notes that the
top container companies have formed three alliances that effectively are cartels.
On the positive side, these alliances potentially reduce costs and rationalize service, which can lower freight rates; on the other hand, according to UNCTAD,
they instead can create a serious risk of establishing corporate oligopolies that
will reduce competition and constrain service.82 The Ocean Alliance consists
of COSCO and CMA CGM (of France); the 2M Alliance links Maersk (of Denmark) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC, of Switzerland); THE Alliance combines Hapag-Lloyd (of Germany), Yang Ming (of Taiwan), and ONE (of
Japan). An effort by Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM in 2014 to form an alliance
to be known as the P3 Alliance was blocked by the Chinese government—a clear
example of governmental intervention designed to support COSCO. Notably, in
2015 the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide a billion dollars in loans or credit to the French CMA CGM to build new ships—in Chinese
shipyards. Since that time, Chinese ties between COSCO and CMA CGM have
continued to deepen.83
As noted earlier, in the port sector China is the global leader in owning, leasing, and operating ports and terminals around the world. Most Chinese companies in the port and terminal business are SOEs; these include COSCO, Shanghai
International Port Group, China Overseas Port Holdings, and China Shipping
Group. China Merchants Holdings and Hutchison Port Holdings are additional
Chinese companies engaged in global port ownership and operation that ostensibly are private companies but have Chinese government investment and
oversight.84 In 2013, China Merchants purchased a 49 percent share of France’s
CMA CGM’s Terminal Link, which operates in many countries, including the
United States. Of particular note, reports in September 2019 indicated that China
Merchants Holdings was in discussion with CMA CGM to invest further in that
company’s port assets. These actions give rise to speculation, if not concern,
regarding how much more of CMA CGM’s shipping and port operations the
Chinese will purchase.85
China’s shipyard sector grew from the 1980s through the first decade of the
twenty-first century, with some 1,647 shipyards built in China. By 2010, China
had become the number one shipbuilder in the world.86 As noted earlier, the
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largest Chinese SOEs in the shipbuilding business were CSSC and CSIC; they
merged in 2019. Following the financial downturn in 2008, many Chinese
private-sector shipyards went bankrupt, while the shipbuilding SOEs received
massive government loans and subsidies. By 2014, three-quarters of all new orders went to Chinese SOE shipyards.87
Despite possible, if not probable, inefficiencies within maritime SOEs, they
enjoy numerous advantages over private-sector companies. They have easy access
to huge loans and subsidies from the central government. In 2017, for example,
the Chinese government announced it would invest $26 billion in COSCO over
the five-year period ending in 2022. Given that COSCO already is number
three in container shipping, an investment of $26 billion easily could propel the
company into the number one spot, possibly leaving in its wake the bankruptcy
of other major container-shipping lines, which already are becoming fewer in
number each year owing to ongoing consolidation.88 In addition to the possible
infusion of substantial state funds to help SOEs compete with private-sector Chinese and international companies, SOEs also enjoy blanket protection in times of
fiscal downturns and uncertainty, as well as huge preferences in terms of government policies and regulatory treatment.
China can use its substantial market power in shipping to achieve dominance
over its competitors. A classic example of this involves the Brazilian corporation
Vale SA. Vale is a large iron-ore mining company based in Brazil. As a major
consumer of iron ore, China has been a crucial customer of Vale for many years.
No doubt to save transportation costs and better manage logistics to China, late
in the first decade of the twenty-first century Vale’s leadership made the decision
to build ultralarge iron-ore bulk carriers instead of chartering vessels to carry
the company’s iron ore to China.89 Vale chose Chinese shipyards to build these
vessels. However, when the vessels were completed and began carrying iron ore
to China, Chinese officials would not let the Vale bulk ships enter Chinese ports,
citing their immense size as a “safety issue.” Vale was forced to sell the vessels to
COSCO, which in turn leased them back to Vale on long-term charter.90 Presumably this somehow must have made the ships safer, because they then were allowed to enter Chinese ports. This is a clear example of protectionism; COSCO’s
leverage as an SOE prevented Vale from entering the trade except on terms that
COSCO accepted.
Chinese government banking entities clearly support the Chinese maritime
industry in all sectors, including shipping, ports, and shipbuilding. Huge sums
of capital have been made available to the industry for projects that promote
Chinese geostrategic goals, not merely normal business investment. The $26
billion that Chinese banks provided to COSCO, mentioned earlier, is a good
example of this. In 2017, the chairman of SASAC noted “the importance of SOEs
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as a mechanism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political
objectives.”91
THE “NEW SILK ROAD,” THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE—
PART OF CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY
China has been an economic and manufacturing powerhouse for much of its
very long history. Since ancient times, Chinese goods have found their way west
via the overland Silk Road through Central Asia, and eventually they traveled
across maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean that were established by
Arab traders. As noted earlier, over the period from the fifteenth century into
the twentieth century Europeans gradually eclipsed Arab traders as European
countries and companies took virtual control of all Chinese imports and exports,
resulting in the “century of shame.” When the PRC was established in 1949, this
clearly was a situation its government was determined to change. It has done so
slowly but steadily through the decades since 1949.
At the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in
2012, China for the first time “elevated the construction of a strong maritime
country” to the level of a national goal.92 By 2013, China had become the world’s
dominant commercial maritime industry leader. But far from being content with
the country’s maritime achievements, President Xi announced in 2013 that the
PRC would establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, later called the One
Belt, One Road initiative, and eventually the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).93 The
vast majority of BRI funding comes from Chinese policy banks (SOEs), such as
the Chinese Development Bank and CEXIM, as well as large Chinese financial
institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China,
the China Construction Bank, and the Silk Road Fund. These institutions are
state owned, or at least state controlled. To date, these Chinese financial institutions have invested, or committed to do so, nearly one trillion dollars in loans for
ports and terminals, railroads, power plants and grids, and other transportationrelated infrastructure.94 With little exaggeration, the BRI can be called the most
expansive, aggressive, and costly transportation and infrastructure scheme ever
developed in human history. Currently, thousands of BRI infrastructure projects
already have been built, are under construction, or are in the planning stages.95
The Chinese have indicated that the BRI ultimately will involve a total of
eight trillion dollars in investments in sixty-eight countries that are home to 65
percent of the world’s population.96 Its two major initiatives are the Silk Road
Economic Belt, an overland route to Europe via railroads and roads, and the Silk
Road Maritime Road, an east–west route via the sea. While the BRI has both land
and sea components, the maritime aspect is the dominant one by far. In 2016,
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for example, 1,700 trains carried cargo from China to Europe via land corridors
through Central Asia, carrying an estimated 150,000 containers. With BRI investments in these corridors, the Chinese estimate that in 2020 the number of
containers carried by BRI roads and railroads will have risen to five hundred
thousand. By comparison, the maritime sea routes from China to Europe in
2014 alone carried some twenty-two million containers, and BRI investments
along the Maritime Silk Road are projected to increase this number greatly in
the years ahead.97 According to the Chinese government, there are three “blue
passages,” or BRI maritime routes, one of which runs “from China to Africa
and the Mediterranean, another to Oceania [in the Pacific] and South Pacific,
and a third through the Arctic to Europe.”98 The BRI also includes projects in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Another major BRI initiative is known as the
Digital Silk Road.99
President Xi has thrown the full weight of his leadership and reputation behind the BRI, and it is hard to overemphasize the full implications of this massive initiative. The BRI may be an outgrowth of former Chinese president Jiang
Zemin’s Going Out policy; however, it is much more prodigious in scale. At the
Nineteenth Party Congress, in 2017, Xi projected that “by 2050, China will have
become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international
influence.” The BRI is a major factor enabling this evolution to happen at present,
and that will continue to be so. Currently, China’s maritime industry—its “blue
economy”—already represents 10 percent of the country’s GDP, and this number
will increase as maritime BRI projects reach fruition.100
China’s public statements on the BRI note “that BRI will greatly benefit humankind and create a new era of world trade and globalization.”101 According to
the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, the purpose of the BRI is to “promote
policy coordination (between countries), connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.” Xinhua goes
further to suggest that, among other things, the BRI “will improve the marine
environment, promote development and eradicate poverty, enhance cooperation
on marine resource utilization, upgrade marine industry cooperation, facilitate
maritime transport, strengthen connectivity of information and networks, improve security and search and rescue, and create innovative growth.”102 These are
lofty goals, and it can be argued that there is some truth in many of these claims.
It is important to understand, however, that from a Chinese perspective the
BRI has many additional advantages. Successful efforts under the BRI will increase export markets for China, which means more money and jobs in China.
BRI projects themselves provide jobs for Chinese construction companies and
tens of thousands of Chinese construction workers, since one of the prerequisites
for a country to accept BRI funding is to employ Chinese construction companies
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and allow Chinese workers to build the targeted infrastructure in whatever
country receives the BRI loans.103 In BRI port projects, Chinese companies
and workers provide everything: finance, design, construction, operation, even
dredging.104 The Chinese construction companies that build BRI infrastructure
are almost all SOEs, such as the China Communications Construction Company, the China Harbor Engineering Company, and the China Road and Bridge
Corporation.105
However, there are many drawbacks and concerns regarding BRI. Some analysts conclude that in many cases BRI is nothing more than a “debt trap.” Poorer
nations that accept BRI infrastructure funding eventually become unable to
fulfill debt payments, resulting in Chinese takeover of the infrastructure. A 2018
study completed by the Center for Global Development noted that “twenty-three
countries are at risk of debt distress as a result of BRI loans from China.”106 The
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is a clear example of this. The Sri Lankan government received a Chinese BRI loan of one billion dollars to build a new port.
By 2017, Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan. This resulted in China obtaining
a ninety-nine-year lease to control the port completely.107 In another instance, in
October 2019 the following was noted in testimony before the U.S. Congress: “In
2019, the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation reported it had obtained a leaked copy
of the agreement between China and Kenya for the construction [under BRI] of
the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway Project. According to Kenyan
media, the contract states that China could take possession of the port of Mombasa should the Kenyan National Railway Corporation default on its $2.2 billion
repayments to China’s Exim Bank.”108
Chinese loans often are provided at a higher interest rate than comparable
loans from other countries and sources. The Chinese SOE banks are successful
in securing these loans at the higher rates because, in most cases, for a variety of
reasons, funds would not be available from any other source. In some cases, Chinese loans are sought because they do not come with the specific requirements
(“strings”) attached that other sources, such as the World Bank, often impose
on those seeking a loan. In the case of the port of Hambantota, for example, no
competitors were interested in providing Sri Lanka a loan.109
There are also real fears (and examples) of BRI funding leading to local corruption. Chinese companies involved in BRI projects have been “accused of
corruption and collusion with local politicians in Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia,
and Bangladesh, among many other countries.”110 The BRI SOE China Communications Construction Company and all its subsidiaries have been shown,
in multiple instances, to have used bribes to officials and their families in many
countries where the company and its subsidiaries had business or planned to
conduct business.111
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Perhaps most troubling are the political influence and favors that Chinese
authorities demand in exchange for BRI funding.112 Via such funding in 2016,
China’s SOE COSCO obtained a controlling interest (51 percent) in the port of
Piraeus in Greece; this proportion was due to increase to 67 percent in 2020.113 It
comes as little surprise that in 2017 Greece and Hungary (also a recipient of BRI
funding) vetoed a “joint EU [European Union] statement criticizing China based
on human rights.” The year before, both countries had refused to sign a joint EU
statement that criticized China’s actions in the South China Sea.114
In some cases, BRI projects have failed to produce tangible benefits for countries even while at the same time saddling them with debt. Vanuatu is a case in
point. Under the BRI, the Chinese constructed a new cruise-ship pier in the country, at a cost of one hundred million dollars. Once completed, however, the new facility failed to meet expectations and adversely affected the country’s economy.115
As Forbes notes, “there are often some key differences between how Chinese
maritime companies operate internationally and what their projects look and
feel like. . . . While China’s new array of port holdings are fundamentally economically motivated projects, there is a glaring political dimension as well.” By
controlling major ports in key countries, China maintains more control over its
import and export supply chains. Through investment and ownership, China
in many cases can exercise political influence over other countries and help ensure that these countries stay friendly to Chinese interests. According to Forbes,
“China is creating a new paradigm in the twenty-first century where economic
leverage is the key.”116 In African countries, through loans and BRI investments,
China has gained considerable political leverage. In Djibouti, for example, China
holds over 80 percent of the nation’s debt. In Zambia, it is reported that China will
take over the power grid because of the country’s inability to pay back Chinese
loans.117 Following the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland was in serious financial peril
as a result of banking failures. In response to this, and in the absence of EU and
U.S. support, Iceland accepted Chinese loans and investments that stabilized the
economy. Since that time, Chinese-Icelandic relations have blossomed, which
provides support for China’s BRI efforts in the Arctic.118
SUMMING UP THE THREATS FROM CHINESE
MARITIME DOMINANCE
In all respects, China is a global power, and the United States and other countries
can expect it to assert its interests, as is normal. However, as numerous observers
have noted, in some industries China has acted in a particularly aggressive manner, with a determination to dominate those industries globally. This certainly
is the case with the maritime industry. While Chinese SOEs in the maritime
industry certainly seek to make money, they also serve the political interests of
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the Chinese state, and in some instances they take actions that result in expected
financial losses because those actions serve the policy goals of the Chinese government. While it is true that Chinese initiatives such as the BRI stand to benefit
dozens of countries and their populations in some ways, Chinese BRI funding
and the related maritime dominance give China sizable political leverage and
influence. According to Carolyn Bartholomew, chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a “major goal of BRI [and the concurrent dominance of China’s maritime shipping industry] is to open more markets
for Chinese goods, displacing goods and services currently provided by the U.S.
and other countries.”119 Since the United States has retreated almost completely
from the global maritime industry through a lack of interest in U.S.-flag shipping
and international port ownership and operation, Chinese goals of controlling access to overseas markets have become ever easier to achieve.
As China’s maritime dominance in shipping, global port ownership, maritime
finance, and shipbuilding continues to grow—as is expected and detailed in
Chinese strategic plans and documents—China concurrently will gain political power and influence. It would be naive to think this will not affect nations
around the world, including the United States and members of the EU. One
only need consider the recent debacle that occurred during the summer of 2019
when a National Basketball Association (NBA) general manager expressed support for protesters in Hong Kong. The government in Beijing was outraged and
demanded an apology. The situation threatened the NBA’s multibillion-dollar
business in China. The result: the NBA backpedaled. The association released a
statement in English that “affirmed both Beijing’s concerns and the league’s support for individuals educating themselves and sharing their views on matters of
importance to them.” But—unbeknownst to most people—the NBA also issued
a different statement in Mandarin that stated, “We are extremely disappointed in
the inappropriate comments by the General Manager.”120 Similarly, a flight attendant working for a subsidiary of Cathay Pacific, an airline based in Hong Kong,
voiced her support for the Hong Kong protesters. The PRC government ordered
the airline to dismiss the flight attendant, and it did so.121 While these events
were relatively minor, one only can imagine the demands that China could make
on countries, including the United States, given further dominance in the global
maritime industry. In 2016, for example, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia, which
greatly displeased the Chinese. So China closed its border with Mongolia—which
is landlocked. This severely affected Mongolia’s economy.122 In yet another example of Chinese bullying, a November 2019 New York Times article noted that
Chinese officials recently had been outraged with the Czech Republic. Developing relations between the two countries and massive Chinese “investment, trade,
and business deals” had prompted the Czech president to declare that “the Czech
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Republic would become China’s gateway to Europe.” All was well until various
events caused Czech leaders to question the commitment their country had made
to the “one China” policy, and even to venture to demonstrate support for Taiwan.
The result was soured relations with the Chinese, who then backed away from
PRC-Czech business deals. China even implemented a policy restricting Chinese
tourists from visiting Prague.123 Recent history is replete with other examples of
China bullying countries and companies, including firms in the United States,
into complying with its wishes—“or else.” Increasing dominance in the global
maritime industry through ship and port ownership, maritime financing, and
BRI funding will ensure the Chinese have ever-increasing leverage to do the
same in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, the United States stands idly by. As far as
international shipping and port operations are concerned, the United States has
absolutely no leverage at all. What is worse is that lack of action on the part of the
United States clearly threatens America’s global trade.
Chinese control in the global maritime industry is the result of aggressive strategic planning coupled with favorable government policies backed by the power
of SOEs and subsidies and other forms of government funding. There simply is
no way for private-sector companies in the global industry to compete with this
on their own. No matter what the economic conditions, SOEs have access to
massive capital that the private sector simply cannot marshal. Further, to protect
SOEs, the Chinese government can restrict outsiders’ ability to compete and can
enact laws and implement other policies that benefit its SOEs—and it has done
so. The Chinese have shown themselves to be masters at this as they developed
and promoted their maritime industries over decades.
A major concern is that the global maritime industry has been consolidating
in all sectors, meaning that with each passing year there are fewer and fewer companies in all sectors of the industry. This is true in shipbuilding, ship operation,
and port ownership and operation, despite the fact that the industry continues to
grow as the global economy becomes more integrated.
Container shipping is but one powerful example of this. Forty years ago,
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the ocean shipping companies that operated freight vessels carrying global trade; there were
hundreds of such concerns, including dozens of U.S.-flag companies. Today,
container-shipping companies carry some 60 percent of all seagoing trade, and
there are many more and larger vessels carrying freight (now mostly in shipping
containers). But the number of companies has been reduced drastically through
acquisitions and mergers. In early 2018, the top fifteen containership operators
carried 70 percent of the global trade; just six months later the number had been
reduced to ten companies carrying the same portion of the trade.124 In 2019, the top
five companies carried the majority of shipping containers.125 In order by size, these
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were A.P. Moller / Maersk (Danish), Mediterranean Shipping Company (Swiss),
COSCO (Chinese), CMA CGM (French, with an association with COSCO), and
Hapag-Lloyd (German). The existence of fewer and fewer companies restricts
competition and can affect service. As noted in an earlier section, UNCTAD
contends that too few container-shipping companies remain to ensure adequate
competition.126
To make matters worse, the companies noted above operate within only three
shipping alliances, which also include smaller companies. These shipping alliances
are essentially cartels, thereby further restricting competition. These alliances—
the 2M Alliance, the Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance—together control 91
percent of global container shipping.127 The large numbers of megacontainerships
built over the past few years or on order have created overcapacity that will linger
for many years. This has resulted, and for the foreseeable future will continue to
result, in lower freight rates, which could force other companies out of business,
spurring even more consolidation in the industry.128 The largest of the containership operators, Maersk, even has suggested that severe competition will result in
only three large companies carrying the vast majority of global trade in containers—no doubt with China’s COSCO being one of those three, if not number one.129
The presence of fewer and fewer companies in any industry tends to result in
higher costs to consumers and poorer service. As COSCO takes more control
over the world’s container shipping, the Chinese government will gain more and
more political leverage over countries that rely on its container-shipping services
and port ownership and operation for their international trade. Economic theory
suggests that if there are too few companies in an industry, such that service and
pricing affect consumers adversely, new companies will form to enter the industry, improve competition, and positively affect costs and service.
Unfortunately, this will not happen in the ocean shipping industry—unless
host governments subsidize the new companies. Entering the global shipping
industry, particularly container shipping, requires billions of dollars and many
years to build vessels, establish service, and obtain port and intermodal connections. It would take years to receive positive returns on investment, and the
likelihood of positive returns would be questionable in any case. In other words,
the likelihood of attracting investors to form new container-shipping companies
is poor, given the economics and time considerations involved.
Still another concern is the current profit margins in container shipping. One
of the reasons the industry has consolidated is that in trying to compete and in
building large fleets of megacontainerships, freight rates have been driven down,
which has pushed companies and investors out of the industry, fueling ongoing
mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number of companies drastically.
Naturally, investors are motivated by profits, and if profits are lacking there is an
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understandable desire to sell unprofitable assets and move on to greener pastures.
With the power of subsidies and other forms of government financing as well
as favorable legislation and policy assistance, Chinese SOEs in shipping and the
maritime industry at large can weather financial storms and economic downturns. They further have the funding and capability to buy out private-sector
companies during economic downturns. Yes, Chinese SOEs, like private-sector
companies, are motivated by profit, but they also are motivated by Chinese government policy and political ambitions.
This all makes for a potentially dangerous situation as far as the global
container-shipping industry is concerned. For example, A.P. Moller / Maersk is a
public company owned largely by the Maersk family and other investors; MSC is
completely privately owned, by a Swiss family; and CMA CGM is a public company owned by investors, as is Hapag-Lloyd. What will happen if global container
rates, already depressed, reach a point at which shipping families and investors
grow tired of poor profit margins and decide to withdraw from the business to
put their funds into more-profitable ventures? In December 2018, Moody’s cut
Maersk’s credit rating—already not the best—from Baa2 to Baa3, “which is at
the bottom of the investment grade bond rating.”130 In the fall of 2019, CMA
CGM reported a second straight quarterly loss and, as was noted earlier, previously had sold 49 percent of its global port-operations entity, Terminal Link, to
a Chinese company to reduce its debt. (There are no data on the second-largest
container-shipping company, MSC, because it is entirely privately owned by a
Swiss family.) In total, container shipping worldwide is on shaky ground, and
further consolidation is likely. This author speculates that the Chinese government, through COSCO and other Chinese companies, will be more than happy
to purchase any containership companies that fail. This happened as recently as
2017, when COSCO purchased the 150-year-old OOCL. So further consolidation in the container-shipping industry is possible, with China benefiting and
COSCO taking even more dominant control of the global industry, which will
result in greater leverage, political and otherwise, for the Chinese government.
Throughout, this article has referred numerous times to how the Chinese
government subsidizes the country’s maritime industries in every sector, and the
degree to which it does so. This is despite the fact that in 2001 China became a
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO rules expressly prohibit government subsidies.131 In the maritime sector, the Chinese simply ignore
these WTO rules, and apparently the rest of the world acquiesces. One Harvard
study indicated that in the shipbuilding industry alone China subsidized shipyard costs by between 13 and 20 percent from 2006 through 2016.132 It is clear
that vast Chinese government funding has been provided to ocean-shipping giant COSCO as well. Given the implied acceptance of this by the rest of the world
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and on the basis of past performance, there is no reason to expect the Chinese to
stop subsidizing their maritime industries. One might argue that Chinese government subsidies of the country’s maritime industry benefit other nations and
people by providing lower-cost shipping, but subsidies distort the market and
ultimately can result in the creation of oligopolies or even monopolies, which
then can dictate service and costs, and in the case of China can exert political
influence as well.
While China merely is poised to dominate the world’s container shipping,
it already dominates shipbuilding and global port ownership and operation.
For decades, the top three shipbuilding countries in the world have been Japan,
Korea, and China. Over 40 percent of the world’s commercial ships now are
built in China, and this percentage is growing as shipyards in other countries no
longer can compete and so cease to operate.133 China is the global leader in ship
finance by providing funds for international shipping companies seeking to buy
and build ships, particularly in Chinese shipyards.134 This means that, although
China may not own or operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it
has influence, if not control, over more than just Chinese-owned ships, because
it holds the mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned or operated by companies throughout the world. In 2017, for example, Chinese SOE banks provided
ship-construction loans of over twenty billion dollars, primarily for construction
in Chinese shipyards. Chinese strategic plans call for China to increase its leadership in ship-construction financing in the decades ahead.135
From a military point of view, in 2015 the Chinese government issued new
guidelines to Chinese shipping companies and shipyards, Technical Standards for
New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements. These guidelines
lay out construction and equipment requirements to ensure that Chinese ships
can support the forces of the People’s Liberation Army, including the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). These guidelines pertain to containerships, RO/RO
vessels, bulk ships, and general-cargo ships.136 These measures will give China—as
the number one shipowner in the world, with thousands of ships under its control—unparalleled strategic sealift capabilities, if not greater overt military power.
Also a matter of concern is the possibility that ports that China constructs or
operates under a BRI initiative ultimately may be used by its military, particularly
the PLAN. The Chinese already have constructed and are using a PLAN base
in Djibouti. In July 2019, the Chinese defense minister commented that “China
is willing to deepen military exchanges and cooperation with the Caribbean
countries and Pacific island countries under the framework of OBOR [BRI].”
Chinese laws compel Chinese companies and SOEs to comply with requests and
demands from Chinese security and intelligence organizations and the military.
This enables these agencies to have global and easy access to intelligence in
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the sixty-eight countries receiving BRI funding and throughout the thousands
of other maritime and BRI projects. Chinese intelligence agencies will benefit
further as BRI funds are made available to install Huawei 5G equipment in BRI
ports and terminals throughout the world.137 When COSCO gained ownership
and control in the Greek port of Piraeus, for example, the company replaced the
network infrastructure with all-Huawei equipment.138
Senior U.S. military personnel and members of Congress have raised the concern that Chinese dominance in the port industry around the world ultimately
could restrict access to critical ports the U.S. Navy needs. Chinese intelligence
agencies’ obvious penetration into these ports will affect U.S. military interests
and security adversely.139 Might China, through its BRI funding or through
bribes, demand that foreign governments deny access to the U.S. military? It is a
very real possibility. Djibouti, for example, has been a recipient of BRI funding,
and China holds the majority of Djibouti’s debt. As noted, the country now has a
PLAN military base. Djibouti also happens to be an important logistics hub for
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Central Command. Might the Djiboutian government
restrict or deny USN access to this base as a result of Chinese influence, funding,
or bribes?140 Might this same tactic be used in other regions of the world where
the U.S. Navy and other elements of the U.S. military operate?
In 2015, Michael P. Pillsbury, the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at
the Hudson Institute, authored a book, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s
Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. The title supplies
the book’s thesis. The author is not only a China expert but a fluent speaker and
writer of Mandarin, which gives him particular insights into what the Chinese
really are thinking. As he frequently notes in the book, the Chinese often say
one thing in an English text but something completely different in the Chinese
version of the same text. With this approach, the Chinese often are able to fool
Western scholars, journalists, and political leaders who do not read and write
Mandarin about what their true motives are. In fact, Pillsbury notes that one of
the main strategies the Chinese have used throughout their history has been to
deceive others about their true intentions. The ancient Chinese military thinker
Sun-tzu, for example, emphasized the importance of deception more than any
other military doctrine.141
Yet as the Chinese have become the world leader in all aspects of the global
maritime industry, including ship ownership, port and terminal ownership
and operations, shipbuilding, ship finance, and maritime education, they have
demonstrated plainly their intention to use the maritime industry to further the
strategic, economic, and political goals of the PRC. Dominance in the maritime
industry, along with concurrent multitrillion-dollar efforts through the BRI,
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will give China truly unparalleled power. The Chinese clearly are trying to sell a
positive message—that these efforts are designed “to kindle a new era of globalization, a golden age of commerce that will benefit all. . . . As Western countries
move backwards by erecting walls, China is contriving to build bridges, both
literal and metaphorical.”142 And to be sure, there are positive aspects to what the
Chinese are doing. China’s decades-long dominance in manufacturing has provided the world with a plethora of consumer goods at moderate prices, which has
raised the standard of living for people around the world. Not surprisingly, the
Chinese are pursuing maritime ambitions as a source of revenue, trade, and jobs
for the Chinese people as well. These alone are not nefarious actions. Still, huge
Chinese maritime SOEs with access to massive government funds and subsidies
and the protection of Chinese laws and policies give the Chinese government
astonishing political leverage and control—on a scale potentially greater than
anything seen in human history.
There are those in the EU and the United States who have expressed concerns
over BRI and the global dominance of the Chinese maritime industry. But these
voices are too few and too often essentially have been ignored, leaving a lack
of action by Western governments. If the Chinese are not “secretly planning to
replace the U.S. as the global superpower,” as Pillsbury suggests, they seemingly
are attempting something very close to it. Their actions prove this, and the West’s
inaction makes their success more possible every day. The time is long overdue
for the United States to reinvigorate its maritime industries and challenge the
Chinese in the same game by using the very same techniques the Chinese have
used to gain dominance in the global maritime industry. The private-sector
maritime industry cannot do this alone—the U.S. maritime industry simply cannot compete against the power of the Chinese state. The United States and allied
governments must bring to bear substantial and sustained political action, policies, and financial support. To do anything less is to cede control of the world’s
maritime industry and global supply chains to China, and perhaps to force the
United States and its allies to enter their own “century of shame.”
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